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S E C R E T SECTION O1 OF 09 TOKYO 14222

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STATE PLEASE RETRANSMIT AS APPROPRIATE

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, CB, CH, US

SUBJECT: CAMBODIA: A/S SOLOMON'S DISCUSSIONS WITH AFM

XU DUNXIN IN BEIJING

1. SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. IN TALKS WITH CHINESE ASSISTANT FOREIGN MINISTER XU DUNXIN ON AUGUST 5, ASSISTANT SECRETARY SOLOMON EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE PRESIDENT BUSH PLACES ON COOPERATION WITH CHINA, BOTH ON REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ISSUES. DR. SOLOMON STRESSED THAT THE U.S. RECOGNIZES THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS,

J A/S SOLOMON EXPLAINED THAT THE IMPETUS BEHIND THE RECENT U.S. POLICY ADJUSTMENT ON CAMBODIA WAS TO MAINTAIN DOMESTIC POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF OUR POLICY. HE REAFFIRMED THAT OUR FUNDAMENTAL POLICY OBJECTIVES HAVE NOT CHANGED. HE ALSO REAFFIRMED U.S. SECRET

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COMMITMENT TO THE PERM FIVE AND PARIS CONFERENCE

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
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PROCESSES. DR. SOLOMON REVIEWED THE DIPLOMATIC STATE
OF PLAY ON A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT FROM THE U.S.
PERSPECTIVE, AND URGED THE CHINESE TO MELP FOCUS ALL
EFFORTS ON THE FORMATION OF A SUPREME NATIONAL
COUNCIL. NOTING THAT THE U.S. HANTS PRIMCE SIHANOUK
TO BE AN INDEPENDENT POLITICAL FORCE, DR. SOLOMON
STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT THE PRINCE DEMONSTRATE AS
MUCH POLITICAL AS HELL AS MILITARY INDEPENDENCE FROM
THE KHMER ROUGE AS POSSIBLE.

DURING THE DISCUSSION, DR. SOLOMON PASSED A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUGH TO PROPRESIDENT YANG SHANGKUN ON THE PERM FIVE ROLE IN ADDRESSING THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUHAIT, AND PROVIDED WRITTEN ANSWERS TO CHINESE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RECENT U.S. POLICY ADJUSTMENTS ON CAMBODIA.

3. ON THE CHINESE SIDE, AFM XU REITERATED CHINA'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE U.S. POLICY ADJUSTMENTS,

RESULTS OF THE MOST RECENT PERN FIVE CONSULTATIONS,



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CAMBODIA LING XIQIU, AS WELL AS BY NORTH AMERICA AND
OCEANIA DIRECTOR ZHANG YIJUN AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR YANG
JIECHI.

5: DR. SOLOMON NOTED THAT HE AND AFM XU HAD BEEN VISITING THE SAME PLACES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA RECENTLY, AND WELCOMED THE FACT THAT BOTH CHINA AND THE U.S. ARE BUILDING A COMMON POSITION ON CAMBODIA WITH THE ASEAN STATES. AFM XU RESPONDED THAT THE CHINESE SIDE WAS PLEASED THAT A/S SOLOMON COULD VISIT BEIJING. XU SAID HE HAD THE IMPRESSION FROM THEIR LAST MEETING IN PARIS THAT DR. SOLOMON WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO COME SO QUICKLY. AFM XU ALSO NOTED THAT A/S SOLOMON HAD MET THE PREVIOUS EVENING WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTEP TIAN ZENGPEI, AND HAD EXCHANGED VIEWS ON A NUMBER OF BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. XU RECOMMENDED THAT THE CURRENT DISCUSSION CONCENTRATE ON CAMBODIA,



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
E.O.12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, CB, CH, US

SUBJECT: CAMBODIA: A/6 SOLDMON'S DISCUSSIONS WITH AFM

THEN PERHAPS ADDRESS OTHER ISSUES IN THE ASIAN REGION IF TIME PERMITTED.

COOPERATION WITH CHINA IMPORTANT TO THE U.S.

6. REPEATING A POINT MADE TO ATM XU DURING THEIR MEETING IN PARIS ON JULY 18, A SOLOMON SAID SECRETARY BAKER WANTED DR. SOLOMON TO STRESS THAT THE SECRETARY UNDERSTANDS THE IMPORTANCE OF SIND-U.S. COOPERATION IN THE REGION, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE SOVIETS ARE THINKING ABOUT BECOMING MORE ACTIVE IN ASIA.



8. CHINESE RESPONSE: AFM XU RESPONDED BY NOTING WITH APPRECIATION THE IMPORTANCE THE U.S. ATTACHES TO CONSULTATIONS WITH CHINA WHEN ADDRESSING ASIAN ISSUES. HE EMPHASIZED CHINA'S BELIEF THAT TIMELY CONSULTATIONS ARE ESSENTIAL TO EFFECTIVE COOPERATION. AFM XU ALSO AGREED THAT, DESPITE SOME RECENT PROBLEMS IN CHINA'S INTERNAL SITUATION AND THE OVERALL STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS, U.S. RELATIONS WITH BOTH CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE IMPORTANT, CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE MANY COMMON INTERESTS, XU AVERRED, AND MANY AREAS IN WHICH TO COOPERATE. CAMBODIA IS ONE OF THESE, XU SAID.


CAMBODIA: U.S. POLICY ADJUSTMENTS

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9. TURNING TO SPECIFIC ISSUES CONCERNING CAMBODIA, DR. SOLOMON BEGAN BY EMPHASIZING THAT THE U.S. MADE THE RECENT ADJUSTMENTS WITH THE OBJECTIVE OP MAINTAINING DOMESTIC POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF OUR POLICY. IF CONGRESS WERE TO END U.S. AID TO THE NCR, OUR STRATEGIC DIRECTION WOULD BE FUNDAMENTALLY UPSET. ADDRESSING THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS RAISED LAST WEEK BY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ZHANG, SOLOMON REAFFIRMED THAT OUR FUNDAMENTAL POLICY OBJECTIVES HAVE NOT CHANGED:



- -- THE U.S. WANTS A COMPLETE END TO THE VIETNAMESE MILITARY PRESENCE WITH U.N. VERIFICATION;
  -- THE U.S. DOES NOT WANT THE KHMER ROUGE TO DOMININATE CAMBODIA, JUST AS IT DOES NOT WANT HUN SEN TO DOMINATE THE COUNTRY;
  -- THE U.S. WISHES TO SEE THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE ACHIEVE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION BY CHOOSING A GOVERNMENT FREELY THROUGH ELECTIONS SUPERVISED BY THE U.N. DR. SOLOMON ALSO STRESSED THAT THE U.S. REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE ERM FIVE AND PARIS CONFERENCE PROCESSES, AND SUPPORTS THE DOCUMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN
- 10. CHINESE COMMENTS: AFM XU OFFERED SOME COMMENTS

JOINTLY APPROVED BY THE PERM FIVE.



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E.Q.12356: DECL: DADR TAGS: PREL, CB, CH, US

SUBJECT: CAMBODIA: `A/S SOLOMON'S DISCUSSIONS WITH AFM

ON THE U.S. POLICY ADJUSTMENTS.

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY SOLOMON RESPONDED BY NOTING THAT, OF COURSE, THE U.S. IS WELL AWARE THAT THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM IS AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUE RATHER THAN A DOMESTIC ONE. WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT DOMESTIC SUPPORT, HOWEVER, OUR POLICY COULD MOVE IN UNDESIRABLE DIRECTIONS. CITING HIS JULY 20 TESTIMONY BEFORE CONGRESS, DR. SOLOMON REVIEWED SOME OF THE IDEAS, INCLUDING RECOGNIZING THE HUN SEN REGIME AND JOINING TOGETHER THE NCR, HUN SEN AND VIETNAM TO OPPOSE THE KR, WHICH CERTAIN AMERICANS ADVOCATE. THE PRESIDENT IS OPPOSED TO SUCH A POLICY, BUT IF HE MADE SUCH A BASIC CHANGE UNDER PRESSURE THIS HOULD TRULY AMOUNT TO A CHANGE IN THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF DUR CAMBODIAN POLICY.' SUCH CHANGES HOULD MAKE CHINA AND ASEAN VERY UNHAPPY INDEED, SOLOMON SAID. FOR THIS REASON, THE U.S. DECIDED TO MAKE THE POLICY ADJUSTMENTS WE ANNOUNCED LAST. MONTH, TO PRESERVE SUPPORT FOR PRINCE SIHANOUK AND THE PERM FIVE PROCESS. 12. SECRETARY BAKER EXPLAINED THIS CLEARLY TO THE SECRET SECRET

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ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS IN JAKARTA, AND THE U.S.
BELIEVES IT HAS ACHIEVED UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POLICY.
WE BELIEVE A BASIS EXISTS FOR A COMMON PERCEPTION OF
THE PROBLEM AND FOR COOPERATION ON ITS RESOLUTION,
SOLOMON SAID. THE NEXT STEP IS TO COORDINATE THE
WORK OF FORMIN ALATAS WITH THE PERM FIVE, TO BOTH FORM
THE SNC AND RECONVENE THE PARIS CONFERENCE.

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THUS, THE U.S. IS CONFIDENT THAT FORMIN ALATAS WILL BE HELPFUL TO DUR COMMON EFFORTS.

THE SITUATUION IN THAILAND IS MORE COMPLICATED, SOLOMON SAID. NOTING THAT PREMIER LI PENG MAY MEET WITH PM CHATICHAI IN SINGAPORE ON HIS WAY BACK FROM JAKARTA, SOLOMON EXPPRISED THE HOPE THAT THE CHINESE COULD GAIN CHATICHAI'S COOPERATION ON THE DIRECTION OF THE PERM FIVE EFFORT.

U.S. POLICY ON CAMBODIA'S U.N. SEAT: A PROBLEM FOR CHINA

14. WITH RESPECT TO THE CAMBODIA U.N. SEAT. A/S SOLOMON EMPHASIZED THAT THE U.S. OBJECTIVE IS TO HAVE THE SEAT OCCUPIED BY A LEGITIMATELY ELECTED

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E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, CB, GH, US
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA: A/S SOLOMON'S DISCUSSIONS WITH AFM


GOVERNMENT. UNTIL THAT OCCURS: HOMEVER, THE BEST ALTERNATIVE IS FOR AN SNC TO BE FORMED EARLY ENOUGH TO TAKE THE SEAT DURING THE UPCOMING UNGA. DR. SOLOMON GUESSED THAT THE U.N. SEAT ISSUE! WILL BE THE TEST OF WHETHER OR NOT HUN SEN AND THE SRV TRULY DESIRE TO COOPERATE IN A POLITICAL PROCESS. DUR COMMON PURPOSE, THEN, IS TO GET THE FOUR FACTIONS TO FORM AN SNC OF INDIVIDUALS, SO IT CAN TAKE THE U.N. SEAT THIS FALL, HE SAID.

## 16. A/S SOLOMON SAID \

IT IS CLEAR THAT THE FREE ELECTIONS WE ALL SEEK WILL NOT BE HELD IN THE NEXT THREE MONTHS, HE SAID, SO NO NEW GOVERNMENT WILL BE FORMED TO TAKE THE U.N. SEAT THIS FALL. NEVERTHELESS, THE U.S. THINKS IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE TO FORM THE SNC BEFORE THE END OF SEPTEMBER; . THE U.S. COULD THEN SUPPORT THE SNC TAKING THE SEAT. THUS, THE FOCUS OF OUR JOINT EFFORTS MUST BE ON GETTING THE SNC IF HUN SEN AND THE VIETNAMESE STALL OR BLOCK THIS PROCESS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL RECOGNIZE THAT THEY ARE THE PROBLEM, SOLOMON REASONED. IF THIS TRANSPIRES, THERE ARE THO ALTERNATIVES: EITHER SET ASIDE THE ISSUE, TRYING TO AVOID A UNGA DEBATE BY "FREEZING" THE SEAT UNTIL THE SNC IS FORMED, OR PROCEEDING TO ATTEMPT TO SEAT THE CGDK, WHICH ASEAN AND CHINA WOULD SUPPORT, BUT THE U.S. COULD NOT. THE U.S. PREFERS THE FIRST OPTION, DR. SOLOMON SAID, ALTHOUGH IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO AVOID A DEBATE ON THE SEAT. 17. AFM XU ASKED WHETHER THE FIRST OPTION MEANS A VACANT SEAT OR THE STATUS QUO; A/S SOLOMON REPLIED THAT IT MEANT SETTING THE ISSUE ASIDE AND "FREEZING" THE SEAT WITH THE CGDK OCCUPYING IT. XU THEN ASKED SECRET SECRET

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WHETHER THE U.S. PLANNED TO CAMPAIGN AGAINST SEATING THE CGDK. DR. JOLDMON RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. "PROBABLY WILL NOT MOUNT A BIG CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE COALITION." BUT WARNED THAT THE EC OR VIETNAM MIGHT DO SO. SOLOMON STRESSED THAT THE U.S. WILL OPPOSE THE HUN SEN REGIME'S TAKING THE SEAT, AND ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT THE U.S. CURRENTLY DOES NOT PROPOSE A VACANT SEAT. SOLOMON SAID THE U.S. WILL WANT TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH CHINA ON TACTICS AT THE UNGA ON THIS ISSUE, ESPECIALLY IF AN SNC IS NOT FORMED.



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DIPLOMATIC STATE OF PLAY

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SUBJECT: CAMBODIA: A/S SOLOWON'S DISCUSSIONS WITH AFM

19. SECONDLY) AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE IN JAKARTA.
AFTER THE PMC, SECRETARY BAKER EXPLAINED THE U.S.
POSITION ON A NUMBER OF CAMBODIAN ISSUES, ESPECIALLY.
THE COMPOSTION OF THE SNC. HIS REMARKS ANSWER IN
PUBLIC MANY OF THE QUESTIONS POSED TO AMBASSADOR
LILLEY BY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ZHANG, SOLOMON SAID. ONE
POINT DESERVES SPECIAL MENTION, HE SAID: SECRETARY
BAKER STRESSED THAT OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE SET WILL BE
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EXCLUSIVELY ABOUT CAMBODIA, AND NOT ABOUT NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS -- ALTHOUGH WE WOULD

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PROBABLY REITERATE
OUR LONGSTANDING POLICY THAT HE WOULD CONSIDER
NORMALIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPLETE AND
VERIFIED WITHDRAHAL OF PAVN TROOPS FROM CAMBODIA AND AN
ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

SHOULD THE VIETNAMESE PRESS US TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS, A/S SOLOMON SAID, WE WILL REAFFIRM OUR CONSISTENT POLICY: NORMALIZATION MUST AWAIT A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT IN CAMBODIA AND ITS PACE AND SCOPE WILL DEPEND ON FURTHER COOPERATION ON POW/MIA AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN ISSUES.

21. SOVIETS WANT TO HELP: FINALLY, DR. SOLOMON SAID SECRET

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THAT FONMIN SHEVARDNADZE SAID IN IRKUTSK THAT THE SOVIET UNION WANTS TO HELP FORGE A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE SRV WOULD COME TO THE NEW YORK TALKS PREPARED FOR SERIOUS DISCUSSION, AND INTIMATED THAT THERE MIGHT BE AN INTERESTING DEVELOPMENT FROM THE VIETNAMESE SIDE IN NEW YORK. SHEVARDNADZE ALSO REITERATED THE PROPOSAL THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD MEET WITH PRINCE SIHANOUK IF THE U.S. AGREED TO MEET WITH HUN SEN. A/S SOLOMON TOLD AFM XU THAT THE U.S. DID NOT AGREE TO SUCH AN "EXCHANGE

SECRET OF MEETINGS" AT THIS TIME, BUT WOULD CONSIDER THE IDEA FURTHER IF IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS. SOLOMON SAID THE U.S. WOULD WANT CHINESE VIEWS ABOUT THE RIGHT TIME TO HOLD SUCH A MEETING. SHEVARDNADZE ALSO SAID THE SOVIET SIDE HANTS AN EARLY CEASEFIRE AND ARMS SUPPLY CUTOFF; THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT SUCH A STEP MUST BE PART OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, DR. SOLOMON SAID. THUS, A/S SOLOMON OBSERVED, THE CURRENT ROUND OF DIPLOMACY IS IN AN ACTIVE PHASE. THE 8.5. MAY WANT TO DISCUSS WITH CHINA HOW TO USE A CEASEFIRE OR A COMPLETE ARMS CUTOFF AS USEFUL ELEMENTS OF THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS. THE U.S. SIDE HOULD WANT TO COORDINATE SUCH DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY WITH CHINA, SOLOMON EMPHASIZED

CHINESE PRAISE PERM FIVE RESULTS.

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E.O.12356: DECL; DADR TAGS: PREL, CB, CH, US

SUBJECT: CAMBODIA: AYS SOLOMON'S DISCUSSIONS WITH AFM

PLEASED WITH PERM FIVE RESULTS: CHINA WAS TVERY HAPPY" WITH THE RESULTS OF THE RECENTLY-CONCLUDED.
FIFTH ROUND OF PERM FIVE CONSULTATIONS ON CAMBODIA, XU SAID. THE POSITIVE RESULTS WERE THE FRUIT OF DUR COMMON EFFORTS, HE CONTINUED: THE FIVE WERE ABLE TO ADDRESS THE THO MOST DIFFICULT ISSUES. - DISPOSITION OF MILITARY FORCES AND THE STRUCTURE OF TRANSIBITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS -- AND TO FORGE CONSENSUS ON THEM. IF THE FIVE CAN PERSUADE THE FOUR FACTIONS TO AGREE AS WELL, XU ARGUED, THEN THE MAJOR PART OF THE PROBLEM WOULD BE RESOUVED: "SOME WOULD SAY, PERHAPS TO PERCENT OF THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM WOULD BE SOLVED WITH AGREEMENT ON THESE TWO MAJOR ISSUES," XU SAID.

FRANCE WILL MAKE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ON AUGUST 7 THAT THE THE DOCMENTS

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HAVE BEEN ADOPTED BY THE PERM FIVE, XU SAID.
... BUT REMAINS CONCERNED ABOUT THE SNC PAPER

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SUBJECT: CAMBODIA: A/S SOLONON'S DISCUSSIONS WITH AFM

27. A/S SOLOMON SAID THE U.S. APPRECIATES THAT CHINA HAS NOW AGREED ON THE LANGUAGE IN THE SNC PAPER IT HAD SECRET
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RESERVED AT THE PARIS PERM FIVE MEETING. REFERRING TO THE ORIGINAL FRENCH TEXT OF AFM XU'S LETTER TO FRENCH

ASIAN DIRECTOR MARTIN, SOLOMON ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF CHINA'S INTENTION WHEN SAYING THAT THE U.N. TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY (UNTAC) "NEEDS TO EXERCISE" NECESSARY POWERS. SOLOMON NOTED THAT THE FRENCH DRIGINAL SAYS "DOIT ETRE EXCERCE" WHICH HE HOULD RENDER AS "SHOULD EXERCISE)," AN INTERPRETATION WHICH WOULD BE STRONGER AND WHICH THE U.S. COULD SUPPORT. CONFIRMED THAT THIS INTERPRETATION REFLECTS CHINA'S IDEA ON THIS SUBJECT. 28. A CONVERSATION ENSUED ABOUT THE TERM THE ... PARTIES" CONSTITUTING THE SNC, ABOUT WHICH CHINA HAD QUERIED THE U.S. SIDE. DR. SOLONON SAID THE U.S HAD RESERVED ITS POSITION ON THIS ISSUE IN PARIS, PREFERRING THE TERM "THE CAMBODIANS THEMSELVES" TO THE CURRENT "THE PARTIES" IN THE SNC DOCUMENT. AFTER CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION BACK AND FORTH, AND MUTUAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN RE-OPENING DISCUSSION OF THIS LANGUAGE WHILE THE FIVE HERE NOT IN SESSION, A/S SOLOMON AND APM XU

CONTACT AND DISCUSS IDEAS ABOUT THE ISSUE.

AGREED THAT THE THO SIDES WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP IN

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DR. SOLOMON THEN REPLIED TO AFM: XU'S COMMENTS: ABOUT THE SNC. DWING TO THE VIOLENCE AND GENOCIDE OF THE KR DURING THE 1970S, NO AMERICAN POLITICAL FIGURE-OR GOVERNMENT DEFICIAL WOULD EVER BE ABLE TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR THE KR. SOLOHON SAID. HE CITED THE QUESTIONS ASKED DURING HIS JULY 20 TESTIMONY ON CAPITOL HILL AS EVIDENCE OF THE STRENGTH OF CONGRESSIONAL FEELINGS ON THIS ISSUE . MOREOVER, THE HISTORY OF THE CAMBODIAN PEACE PROCESS INDICATES CLEARLY THAT THE FOUR FACTIONS SIMPLY CANNOT COOPERATE. EXAMINING THE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE FACTIONS AT THE PCC, THE THREE JAKARTA MEETINGS AND THE RECENT TOKYO MEETING MADE US CONCLUDE THAT HAVING "PARTIES" OR "FACTIONS" COMPOSE THE SNC IS THE HRONG WAY TO PROCEED. A/S SOLOMON REMINDED XU THAT OUR VIEWS ON THE SNC HAD BEEN COMMUNICATED TO HIM IN A JUNE 21 LETTER. DR. SOLOMON STRESSED THAT THE U.S., SECRET SECRET

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TOO, WANTS A POLITICAL, NOT A MILITARY, SETTLEMENT. THE U.S. POSITION ON A SNC COMPOSED OF INDIVIDUALS IS

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CONSISTENT WITH THAT GOAL, FOR THIS REASON, WE
PROPOSED THAT THE SNC BE FORMED OF INDIVIDUALS WITH
AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA WHO REPRESENT "THE FULL RANGE OF
POLITICAL OPINION." THE THIS, AGREES WITH CHINA THAT
THE SNC MEMBERS SHOWED BE ACCEPTABLE TO ONE ANOTHER.

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34. A/S SOLOMON RESPONDED, SAYING THAT IF THE FOUR FACTIONS CAN AGREE TO FORM AN SNC. OF INDIVIDUALS, THE U.S. HOULD SAY "WE SUPPORT A POLITICAL SOLUTION LEADING TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN CAMBODIA. IF THE PROPOSED NEMBERS OF THE SNC ARE ACCEPTABLE TO EACH OTHER AS INDIVIDUALS, THEN THE U.S. WILL NOT OPPOSE THE SNC." SHOULD CRITICS OF THIS POSITION ASK HOW THE U.S. CAN TOLERATE AN SNC THAT HAS KR PARITICIPATION, WE HOULD RESPOND THAT THE QUESTION IS FOR THE KHMER THEMSELVES TO DECIDE. MOREOVER, IF THE SNC DECIDES TO PERMIT THE KHMER ROUGE AS A PARTY TO PARTICIPATE IN ELECTIONS, WE WOULD SAY THAT THIS ISSUE IS ALSO ONE FOR THE CAMBODIANS TO DECIDE, FOR THEMSELVES, AS PART OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT WHICH AVOIDS A MILITARY SOLUTION, SOLOMON SAID.

SIHANDUK MUST BE AN INDEPENDENT POLITICAL FORCE SECRET SECRET

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35. IN THE PAST, DR. SOLOMON SAID, THE U.S. HAS

SECRE'T EXPRESSED SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT MILITARY COOPERATION ON THE GROUND BETWEEN THE ANS AND THE KR. WHY SOME IN CONGRESS WANT TO CURTAIL ASSISTANCE TO THE NCR HAS BECAUSE KEY LEGISLATORS SAW SIGNS OF SUCH COOPERATION, WHICH VIOLATES OUR LAWS, SOLOMON ARGUED. THE U.S. STRONGLY RECOMMENDS, THEREFORE, THAT PRINCE SIHANDUK DEMONSTRATE AS MUCH POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY INDEPENDENCE FROM THE KHMER ROUGE AS POSSIBLE, WHICH WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE U.S. TO CONTINUE SUPPORTING HIM. DR. SOLOHON SAID THE U.S. UNDERSTANDS THAT THE PRINCE PLANS TO RETURN TO ON AUGUST 11 TO HOLD A MEETING OF THE BEIJING RESISTANCE FACTIONS SOME TIME AFTER AUGUST 23. THE PRINCE MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT EMPHASIZING HIS SOLIDARITY WITH THE KR, SOLOMON SAID, THE RESULT COULD BE FURTHER WEAKENING OF OUR ABILITY TO SUPPORT HIM. THE U.S., SOLOMON SAID, WANTS PRINCE SIHANOUK TO BE A GENUINELY INDEPENDENT POLITICAL FORCE.

BREER